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ECONOMICS, POLITICS AND LAW:
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE WORLD




A S SPRING turned into summer in the first year of the Carter
presidency, the Laker Skytrain was still only a proposal; the
Super-Apex (the cheapest of the Advance Purchase Excursion
Fares) and other deep-discount promotional fares were hardly even
on the drawing boards; the Civil Aeronautics Board's (CAB) char-
ter rules were growing more expansive but were still quite limiting;
and the CAB's new chairman, Alfred Kahn, was just beginning to
make his presence known as a central figure in the drama of inter-
national air transportation.
A year later when the bulk of this article was written, Skytrain
had weathered the winter and was fanning out to other cities; the
Super-Apex fare was accepted throughout the transatlantic market;
ever cheaper budget and standby fares promised to be available
between virtually every United States and European gateway point;
the International Air Transport Association (IATA) had essen-
tially lost its impact on passenger rate-making over the North At-
lantic; the U.S.-origin charter rules had been so liberalized as to
move CAB Member O'Melia to call them "scheduled charters";
and the charter carriers were seriously questioning whether all of
* This article is adapted and brought up to date from a report submitted to
the Tenth International Congress of Comparative Law, held in Budapest in Au-
gust, 1978. Mr. Lowenfeld is a Professor at New York University Law School,
and Mr. Mendelsohn is a partner in the Washington, D.C., law firm of Glassie,
Pewett, Beebe and Shanks. Both authors have been closely involved in all phases
of international aviation since their work in the U.S. State Department during
the 1960's.
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these changes might not work to bring about their own demise. Not
since the close of World War II had there been a period so marked
by institutional changes in international civil aviation as was the
time span of 1977 to 1978.
Each side of the Atlantic Ocean has its views and predictions as
to what will ultimately emerge from these changes. The American
side, or at least the United States government, views them as
healthy examples of competition and free enterprise. The European
side, or at least some of Europe's vocal aviation leadership, seems
to view them as another unpleasant example of how the United
States is again unilaterally throwing its weight around and disrupt-
ing "orderly development."
This article undertakes to spell out some of the essential aspects
of the changes in United States charter law and policy. Because the
changes occurred so rapidly, we begin by tracing the development
within United States law of the air charter concept-from the origi-
nal concept of the affinity charter to the most current version of the
public charter approach. We end with an epilogue to take account
of the sudden departure from the aviation scene of Chairman Kahn,
and of the passage, after years of effort, of a deregulation bill.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CAB's CHARTER RULES-
FROM AFFINITIES TO PUBLIC CHARTERS
The carriage of passengers for hire by enterprises other than
scheduled airlines got its major start in the United States after
World War II, when a large number of surplus aircraft and of
trained but unemployed pilots came on the market. In the first fif-
teen years after the war, there was a continuous battle in the United
States between so-called "irregular carriers" and the major airlines
about the scope of charter operations, with the CAB changing sides
as the technical issues (and the membership of the Board) varied
In 1962 the Congress enacted legislation creating a new class of
"supplemental carriers" and setting forth severe restraints on in-
dividual ticketing applicable to "supplemental transportation" per-
formed by supplemental carriers.' In 1964 as aircraft were be-
'A summary of the events and some of the litigation in this period is given
in A. LOWENFELD, AVIATION LAW, ch. IV, § 1 (1972).
'See Act of July 10, 1962 Pub L. No. 87-528, 76 Stat. 143, 49 U.S.C. 55
1301(32), (33), 1371(d)(3). See also [1962] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 179.
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coming progressively larger, the CAB (with Presidential assent)
authorized so-called "split charters" in transatlantic service, where-
by two groups consisting of a smaller number of passengers than
make up a full plane-load would be permitted to share in the char-
ter of a plane.' These were still affinity groups (i.e., members of a
club, society, university, etc.), but the decision marked the begin-
ning of heightened competition between supplemental and sched-
uled carriers for tourist travel over the North Atlantic.
In 1966 the CAB decided to extend its charter rules to permit
so-called "Inclusive Tour Charters." The Inclusive Tour Charter,
or ITC, was not really a package or "all-inclusive tour," but it re-
quired some ground services, stopovers in at least three cities fifty
miles or more apart, a minimum stay of ten days (in its interna-
tional version), and a price at least 110 percent of the lowest fare
charged by a scheduled air carrier for comparable individually
ticketed travel. In retrospect, one wonders why such a massively
conditioned form of transportation could ever have been viewed as
a threat by the scheduled carrier industry, but it was. And though
sustained for domestic transportation by the U. S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia in American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB,'
the ITC was disapproved for foreign transportation by the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Pan American World Airways,
Inc. v. CAB' on the ground that the CAB had exceeded its author-
ity in blurring the distinction between individually ticketed and
bulk transportation. Following these inconsistent interpretations of
the same statute and a four to four deadlock in the Supreme Court,
the Congress adopted an amendment to the Federal Aviation Act,
expressly permitting ITC's, but-a fact not widely appreciated at
the time-authorizing scheduled as well as supplemental carriers
3 Transatlantic Charter Investigation, 40 CAB 233 (1964), afl'd, American
Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 348 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1965). The split charter rules
were originally published at 29 Fed. Reg. 6005 (1964), former 14 C.F.R. 5
208.6(c).
4 Supplemental Air Service Proceeding, 45 CAB 231 (1966); Reopened Trans-
atlantic Charter Investigation (All Expense Tour Phase), 45 CAB 425 (1966).
The ITC rules were originally published at 31 Fed Reg. 4779 (1966), former
14 C.F.R. Part 378.
5365 F.2d 939 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966).
6380 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1967), aff'd by an equally divided court, 391 U.S.
461 (1968).
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to engage in this form of charter service.! Because of the restric-
tions attached to the ITC, it continued to be eclipsed by traditional
affinity charters even as the affinity requirements for those charters
proved, in practice, to resemble more and more the requirements
for so-called "clubs" in places where alcoholic beverages may not
be sold to the public.
In 1972, in order to make charters available to persons who
were not interested in ground packages, the CAB came up with
so-called "Travel Group Charters" (TGC's). Like ITC's, TGC's
did away with the requirement of prior affinity among the mem-
bers, but they still required a group of at least forty, a ten-day
minimum trip outside the United States, a sixty-day advance pay-
ment, and a pro rata cost-sharing plan that only the experts and
readers of microscopic print were ever able to understand. Perhaps
because of its complexities (and also because illicit affinity charters
were still flourishing during this period), the TGC was very nearly
a still-birth.8 But it was an important part of the liberalizing trend,
and on legal challenge by the scheduled carriers, it was sustained
by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
in Saturn Airways, Inc. v. CAB.'
Following these two largely unsuccessful experiments, the CAB
in 1975 adopted a new Part 378a of its Regulations, providing for
a "One Stop Inclusive Tour Charter" (OTC).* The OTC, like the
ITC, depended on no specific affinity, required a ground package,
and required a minimum group of forty; but the OTC required
only one stopover rather than the three required under the ITC. In
addition, it required (for transatlantic travel) a minimum duration
of only seven days and prepayment only thirty days before de-
"See Act of September 26, 1968 Pub. L. No. 90-514, 82 Stat. 867, 49 U.S.C.
1301(33), 1371(e) (6). See also [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1007,
3594.
8 Between 1955 and 1969, charter revenues of U.S. certificated air carriers
grew at an average annual rate of some 22%. The vast majority of this growth
through the mid-1970's was in either affinity charters (some legal but many not)
or single entity charters. In 1973, for example, ITC's and TGC's accounted for
only 13% of all charter passengers on U.S.-origin domestic and international
flights. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to Liberalize Charter Rules, CAB
Docket No. 32242 (Mar. 14, 1978) at nn.1, 3.
8483 F.2d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The TGC rules were originally published at
37 Fed. Reg. 20,808 (1972), former 14 C.F.R. Part 372a.
10The OTC rules were originally published at 40 Fed. Reg. 34,089 (1975),
former 14 C.F.R. Part 378a.
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parture. As with every bulk fare promulgated by the CAB, the va-
lidity of OTC's was challenged in court by the scheduled carriers.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld
the OTC in Trans World Airlines v. CAB.1
On September 1, 1976, the CAB adopted still another idea, this
one borrowed from the British, the Advance Booking Charter
(ABC)." ABC's included air transport only, without the need to
purchase ground services from or through the tour operator. An
ABC required a minimum group of forty travellers, a minimum
duration of seven days, and prepayment in full at least forty-five
days before the date of departure. The tour operator was permitted
to make substitutions in the passenger list up to a limit of twenty
percent of the seats contracted for.
We will never know how successful the ABC or OTC would have
been on their own, because their introduction coincided with a
sharp and continuing enforcement program by the CAB and the
Justice Department against illegal affinity charters. The statistics
show that by 1977 the CAB had finally managed to create a suc-
cessful substitute for the affinity charter. The third quarter of 1977
experienced roughly the same twenty-two to twenty-three percent
annual increase in charter travel over the comparable period of the
prior year, but now ABC's and OTC's accounted for over two-
thirds of U.S.-origin charter passengers, while affinity charters ac-
counted for only some twelve percent.'3
It is quite likely that the ABC-OTC duo would have remained
the prevailing regime for several years had it not been for the ar-
rival of Freddie Laker in New York and Alfred Kahn in Washing-
ton. Once Skytrain, the no-reservation no-frills service offered by
Laker, caught on in the fall of 1977 and was more or less matched
by "budget" and "standby" fares offered by the major scheduled
carriers, the CAB began to be concerned that the U.S. supple-
mental carriers might not be able to compete. It was now essential,
the Board decided, to further liberalize the sale of charter trans-
portation so that the supplemental industry could remain viable.
11 545 F.2d 771 (2d Cir. 1976).
1The ABC rules were originally published at 41 Fed. Reg. 37,763 (1976),
former 14 C.F.R. Part 371.
3 See CAB Docket No. 32242, note 8 supra, at n.4.
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Starting with decisions handed down in November and Decem-
ber 1977," the Board: (1) eliminated the thirty-day advance pur-
chase requirement for international OTC's; (2) reduced the ad-
vance purchase ABC requirement from forty-five to fifteen days;
(3) eliminated entirely the seven-day minimum stay requirement
of both the ABC and OTC; (4) reduced the ABC and OTC re-
quirement of minimum group size from forty to twenty; and, (5)
allowed a fifteen percent last-minute fill-up sale on ABC's.
By January 3, 1978, the scheduled carrier industry had filed its
appeal from these decisions with the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit." There may never be a
decision on this appeal, however, because on March 14, 1978, the
Board announced that its earlier surgery had been insufficient: as
of July 25, 1978, unless it could be persuaded otherwise, the Board
intended to do away with the entire alphabet game of ABC's,
OTC's, TGC's, and even affinity charters (as well as the less well
known but still used study group charters and special event char-
ters), and substitute for all these a single "Public Charter."" A
Public Charter, as the Board proposed, would require no minimum
group size, no advance purchase requirement, no requirements for
ground accommodations, no length of stay rules, no minimum char-
ter price, and no round trip requirement. In addition, all bases for
discount pricing permitted on scheduled services (e.g., for children,
senior citizens, standbys, etc.) were to be allowed for Public Char-
ter service."
4 See One Stop ITC Elimination of Advance Purchase Requirement, CAB
Docket No. 29926, Part 378a (Nov. 3, 1977); ABC's Interim Liberalization of
Charter Rules, CAB Docket No. 31520, Part 371 (Dec. 15, 1977).
15 The seven carriers joining this appeal were American, Eastern, National,
Northwest, Pan American, TWA, and Western. See American Airlines v. CAB,
No. 78-1009 (D.C. Cir., filed Jan. 3, 1978).
10 CAB Docket No. 32242, note 8 supra.
17 For those with families, the discounted children's fares, available on sched-
uled services but usually not available with the per seat pricing on charter services,
often meant that the total family cost for a scheduled flight was sufficiently close
to the charter price as to make scheduled service, with its advantages of flexibility
and much greater choice of schedules, the more attractive option. It will be inter-
esting to see what pricing approach the charters will use to attract families. Given
an approach based on fully distributed costs, any reduction for children's seats
should mean some proportionate increase in adult seat prices.
INTERNATIONAL AIR CHARTERS
H. THE FIRST RESPONSE TO THE PROPOSAL FOR PUBLIC
CHARTERS-THE TOUR OPERATORS AND SUPPLEMENTAL
CARRIERS RETHINK THEIR STRATEGIES
Even before the ink was dry on the proposal for Public Charters,
the supplemental carriers and the tour operators were declaring
that the whole bulk transportation industry was on the "brink of
extinction." What seems to have happened is that the British gov-
ernment, which had held the line against extending the budget and
standby fares beyond London or from any United States point other
than New York to London, abandoned its stand in the face of
a new low-fare (or rather non-restraint) air service agreement be-
tween the United States and the Netherlands.18 One could expect
that other European scheduled carriers-and the growing number
of U.S.-flag scheduled carriers serving the Continent-would now
match the United States-Amsterdam and United States-London
fares. But if this happened, the price advantage of the supplement-
als would practically disappear. In response to the anguished cries
of the supplementals and the tour operators, the Board let it be
known (in one of its now famous "Sunshine Meetings") that it
might be willing to let most, if not all, of the Public Charter rules
enter into effect immediately rather than awaiting the earlier an-
nounced date of July 25, 1978.'" The scheduled carriers replied
almost immediately with the threat of an injunction proceeding,
which at the least would have delayed the start of Public Charters
until mid-summer; thereafter the Board backed off from the idea
of an accelerated starting date. On April 19, 1978, however, the
Board on an emergency basis temporarily waived some other im-
portant restrictions previously applicable to OTC's, ITC's, ABC's
and other existing charters." This step too was almost immediately
challenged by the scheduled carriers in the Court of Appeals, but
they did not succeed in obtaining a stay of the Board's order."'
18 See N. Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1978, at 1; id., Mar. 18, 1978, at 29; 236 Av.
DAILY 82 (1978). See Protocol [adopted ad reterendum on March 10, 19781
Relating to U.S.-Netherlands Air Transport Agrement of 1957, T.I.A.S. No. 8998.
1' TRAVEL WEEKLY, Apr. 10, 1978, at 1. See CAB Order 78-4-49, Docket
Nos. 32397, 31091 (Apr. 11, 1978).
'0 See CAB Order 78-4-122, Docket No. 32397 (Apr. 19, 1978).
2 The appeal by the scheduled carriers was filed on June 1, 1978. American
Airlines v. CAB No. 78-1485 (D.C. Cir. filed June 1, 1978). The stay was denied
by the Court on June 29, 1978, and the appeal was later withdrawn. See note
1979]
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Tour operators, meanwhile, were undertaking major advertising
campaigns throughout the country to try to convince the American
public that charters still offered the cheapest fares. They were also
trying, unsuccessfully as it proved, to persuade the Board to re-
quire that scheduled carriers advertise the precise number of dis-
count seats available in a market, so that the public would under-
stand that the chances of picking up low-price seats on scheduled
flights were very limited and that charters were therefore more
dependable." In addition, the supplemental carriers claimed that
the Super-Apex and budget fares of the scheduled carriers required
substantial advance booking, while the new charter rules would
permit almost a last-minute decision for passengers using supple-
mental transportation. It used to be, of course, that claims about
dependability, reliability, and last-minute decisions to travel were
all the hallmarks of scheduled service. But by 1978, hardly anyone
could tell which was the cart and which was the horse.
One more point: if the horse and the cart (scheduled and supple-
mental transportation) were by now almost indistinguishable, it is
no wonder that the coachman did not know where to sit. Most tour
operators had once been comfortably in the camp of the supple-
43 infra, and accompanying text. See also 236 Av. DAILY 301 (1978), TRAVEL
WEEKLY, Apr. 27, 1978, at 1. Whether the courts would hold that Public
Charters are individually ticketed transportation and therefore inconsistent with
Section 101(36) of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1301(36) (1976),
is a troublesome question. The major remaining difference between individually
ticketed and supplemental transportation is that the Public Charter must be
sold through a middleman, the tour operator. But possibly as many as 75%
of all scheduled carrier seats are sold through a middleman, the travel agent,
andT in many instances tour operators are also licensed travel agents. On the
other hand, a major difference between "scheduled" and "supplemental" trans-
portation is that the travel agent, when booking a seat on a scheduled carrier
takes no risk, while a tour operator contracting for charter space takes the
risk that he might not be able to resell the space. Largely because of this dis-
tinction, the U.S. Department of Justice holds to the view that all charter rules
are legal so long as they "do not permit public sales of individual tickets by
the direct air carrier." TRAVEL WEEKLY, Nov. 14, 1977, at 3. Balanced against
this, however, is the judicially declared authority of the CAB to evolve a defini-
tion of charter service in accordance with experience and changing circumstances
"as long as the integrity of scheduled service traffic is not vitiated." Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 545 F.2d 771, 774 (2d Cir. 1976). It is perhaps ironic that,
if read literally, this test is much the same ex post facto type test that was so well
known in the era of Bermuda I. In other words, whether "integrity .. . is not
vitiated" can probably be determined only after, not before, the event.
'2 One tour operator even suggested that the scheduled carriers be required to
keep their cheap fares in effect for five years as a condition for their approval.
See TRAVEL WEEKLY, Apr. 10, 1978, at 1.
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mentals (indeed the Board had from time to time looked into the
independence between tour operators and supplemental carriers,
as required by law). But in the summer of 1978 a falling out be-
tween the tour operators and the supplementals seems to have taken
place that may be irreconcilable: apart from "Inclusive Tour Char-
ter Trips" which the supplementals asserted were virtually defunct,
could supplemental carriers now sell tickets directly to the public?
Could they thus bypass the tour operators, or establish their own
tour operators, and in any case, compete directly on even terms
with the scheduled carriers? Under the statute, the answer is not
easy. The argument advanced by the supplementals that they do
have this right may have some basis, reasoning by analogy from a
precedent-setting 1976 court decision holding that supplemental
carriers are eligible for scheduled carrier certificates."
Still another development worth watching is whether the charter
carriers will intensify their efforts to become scheduled carriers.
Trans-International Air Lines (TIA), perhaps the most powerful
of the supplemental carriers because it is owned by a major finan-
cial conglomerate, Transamerica, was actively attempting in 1978
to secure rights to conduct both a scheduled Laker-type operation
between Los Angeles and London, and a low fare scheduled service
across the Pacific?' Also, the three major surviving United States
supplemental carriers, World, Capitol, and TIA, each made appli-
cations (differing in their details) to operate scheduled low-fare
transcontinental services in the United States.' In addition, World
Airways had made an arrangement early in 1978 with the Grey-
hound Bus Company to provide a feeder service from thirty-three
cities to World's terminals at Newark, Baltimore, Oakland, and Los
"World Airways v. CAB, 547 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1976). On April 11, 1978,
the CAB opened an examination into the question of whether supplemental car-
riers should be permitted under existing law to sell individual tickets to fill up
planes, otherwise dedicated to charter flights. See CAB Order 78-4-50, Supple-
mental Carrier Fill-Up Case, Docket No. 32398 (Apr. 11, 1978). If this inquiry
results in an affirmative decision, one may wonder whether the concept of "supple-
mental" transportation will retain any distinctive meaning. It is significant, how-
ever, that when it came time in late May, 1978, for the supplementals to comment
on the CAB's proposal, they were distinctly unenthusiastic, arguing that it would
be of limited usefulness and far less important than granting the supplementals
the scheduled rights they were then seeking. TRAVEL WEEKLY, May 29, 1978, at 5.
"See CAB Docket Nos. 31297, 30917.
" See Transcontinental Low Fare Route Proceeding, CAB Docket No. 30356.
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Angeles airports.'* If World could implement an ambitious plan of
this type for transcontinental service, one could expect that a com-
parable transatlantic plan would not be far behind; and indeed, by
the end of April, 1978, World had applied to the CAB for low-fare
scheduled transatlantic authority between the United States and the
Netherlands." Finally, Seaboard World Airways, which throughout
its history had been an all-cargo carrier only, also asked the CAB
for authority to operate scheduled transatlantic passenger services,
arguing that it was the lowest cost scheduled carrier flying the At-
lantic and that it could and would offer a $100 one-way New York-
London fare."
III. CHARTER RULES AND BILATERAL ACCORDS-THE
UNITED STATES, THE DUTCH, AND THE BRITISH
With all of the developments described in the preceding section,
the single largest problem for United States-based supplemental
carriers became whether Europe would accept the new, liberalized
American charter concepts.
In brief, the United States proposed that for charters-typically
round-trip (or circular) group travel-its rules be accepted as a
matter of course by the state of destination, in return for accept-
ance by the United States, without review, of whatever rules that
state prescribed for charters originating there with the United States
as the destination. The agreement between the United States and
the Netherlands of March 10, 1978,9 was the first bilateral accept-
ance of this "country of origin" principle, at least since the prospect
of "public charters" became apparent."
The question of which European destinations would be open to
liberalized U.S. charters became critically important because, even
28 235 Av. DAILY 275 (1978).
27 See U.S.-Benelux Proceeding, CAB Docket No. 30790. See also 236 Av.
DAILY 314 (1978); TRAVEL WEEKLY, May 1, 1978, at 4.
2 8See CAB Docket No. 30790; 236 Av. DAILY 11 (1978).
29 See note 18 supra.
30Two earlier "country-of-origin" understandings had been signed by the
United States, with Belgium in June, 1977, T.I.A.S. No. 8618, and with Yugoslavia
in June, 1977, T.I.A.S. No. 8972. Certain other understandings between the
United States and Spain, Portugal, Switzerland, and Austria could be construed
to provide for country-of-origin rules, but this was not clear. See TRAVEL WEEK-
LY, Dec. 29, 1977, at 1; id., Mar. 13, 1978, at 95.
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as the ratio of chartered to scheduled U.S. citizen passengers to
Europe increased from thirty-two percent in 1976 to forty percent
in 1977, nearly half of all Americans travelling on charters in 1977
turned out to be travelling to only two destinations-the Federal
Republic of Germany (twenty percent) and Great Britain (thirty
percent). Only some five percent were destined first to the Nether-
lands (see Chart I). The agreement with the Netherlands was still
CHART I
U.S. CITIZEN DEPARTURES To EUROPE
Scheduled Charter
1976 1977 1976 1977
Europe 2,531,483 2,675,558 819,791 1,067,873
Austria 10,934 13,155 7,429 8,230
Belgium 51,523 54,131 15,688 9,337
Berlin 181 19 770 1,438
Bulgaria n.a. 0 n.a. 115
Czechoslovakia 4,789 4,308 597 521
Denmark 91,571 94,506 5,239 10,114
Finland 9,614 9,564 2,846 2,755
France 223,889 231,148 65,972 89,674
Germany 307,311 316,515 164,138 200,663
Greece 103,858 111,640 26,794 32,805
Hungary 2,142 1,630 1,867 1,593
Iceland 68,136 58,941 613 261
Ireland 85,275 81,992 50,950 73,976
Italy 236,345 252,832 66,701 87,552
Luxembourg 17,254 17,557 117 578
Malta 0 0 166 578
Netherlands 128,553 141,695 41,864 53,124
Norway 14,308 15,885 6,478 4,450
Poland 10,400 10,392 10,260 12,047
Portugal 39,003 45,941 4,004 19,285
Rumania 2,892 2,665 3,419 2,624
Spain 124,044 129,264 62,957 59,995
Sweden 9,773 4,901 7,357 7,570
Switzerland 126,721 143,119 52,208 65,336
U.S.S.R. 9,354 4,901 7,357 7,570
U.K. 849,711 921,075 213,782 313,863
Yugoslavia 3,902 6,889 5,671 7,394
Source: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service.
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a major breakthrough. However small its share of past U.S.-origin
charter travel, Holland is not only a country of considerable avia-
tion significance, but, more important, it is a major potential sub-
stitute competitive destination point in Western Europe. As a hub
for onward travel on the continent, it clearly has the potential of
equalling and possibly even exceeding the U.K. Moreover, to the
extent that the Netherlands accepted (or shared) the United States
approach, the agreement between the two countries could certainly
have substantial value in other countries of Western Europe, both
as an inducement and as a precedent. Not only do Articles 2 and
4 of the 1978 Agreement between the United States and the Neth-
erlands prescribe a full-fledged country-of-origin rule, but Article
6(a), quoted in full below, sets out a philosophy of competition
that seems unprecedented in the history of international aviation.
Article 6(a): Both Contracting Parties desire to facilitate the
expansion of international air transportation opportunities over the
routes specified in the Schedule attached to the Agreement, as
amended by Article 3 of this Protocol, as well as in charter trans-
portation. This objective can best be achieved by making it pos-
sible for airlines to offer the traveling and shipping public a vari-
ety of service options at the lowest fares, rates, and prices that are
not predatory or discriminatory and do not tend to create a mo-
nopoly. In order to give weight to this objective, each Contracting
Party shall encourage individual airlines to develop and imple-
ment competitive fares, rates and prices. Accordingly, the Con-
tracting Parties agree that such fares, rates, and prices should be
set by each designated airline based primarily on commercial con-
siderations in the marketplace and that governmental intervention
should be limited to prevention of predatory or discriminatory
practices, protection of consumers from the abuse of monopoly
power, and protection of airlines from prices that are artificially
low because of direct or indirect governmental subsidy or support.
To be sure, the United States paid a price for these provisions,
in the form of a grant to the Netherlands of new traffic rights for
KLM at Los Angeles and also at any one other city in the United
States to be later selected by the Netherlands. This kind of liberal-
ity in "giving away" points in the United States was perhaps even
more unprecedented in post-war aviation history than the policy of
inviting competition. But the United States-Netherlands agreement
was a clear signal that the United States was prepared to stand
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firm on the principle that fares should depend only on the country-
of-origin rules and that for the United States this included promo-
tional fares. Further, the United States was prepared to pay for ac-
ceptance of its positions in the currency of route grants. In the
words of the Carter administration, today's objective is to "trade
rights, not restrictions."
Some airline critics in the United States have argued that the
U.S. government need not give away nearly so much simply to se-
cure acceptance of country-of-origin charter rules. They argue
that in trading landing rights for charter liberality, the United
States is exchanging permanent rights for nothing more than prom-
ises of future performance. On the other hand, some Europeans
have been heard criticizing the Dutch for breaking ranks in favor
of competition rather than control.
It is very difficult to judge the value of exchanges such as those
between the United States and the Netherlands. As to the new
routes, one may recall that Italy negotiated for almost ten years to
obtain rights to serve Los Angeles, only to have Alitalia totally ig-
nore the city once the route was secured. Similarly, Spain negotiat-
ed hard for the right to serve Boston and Washington, only to have
Iberia abandon service to both cities. Moreover, as the United
States continues to open new U.S. cities to different foreign carri-
ers, the value of any given traffic right necessarily diminishes, sim-
ply because of the increasing competition-in price as well as par-
ticipants-that the new entrants will be facing in those markets.
Moreover, the series of services by new United States-flag entrants
into international transport, such as the new Braniff service from
Dallas to London, the new Delta service from Atlanta to London,
and National's expanded service from Florida to Frankfurt, Am-
sterdam, Paris, and London, all add to the competition. The one
salient factor that emerges from the mass of predictions and inno-
vations is (for once) a consistent philosophy-something not al-
ways apparent in past United States aviation policy. In 1978, the
United States committed itself to a program of opening up all vari-
eties of competition, between traditional and new gateways, be-
tween domestic and foreign carriers, between scheduled and char-
ter services, and between different destinations for the American
tourist in Europe.
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Within a few days after conclusion of the agreement between the
United States and the Netherlands, a somewhat comparable liberal-
izing charter agreement was signed by the United States and Great
Britain." But this agreement, like Bermuda II,"2 is ambiguous in
result. An annex, which will remain in effect for two years, pro-
vides for a twenty-one day advance purchase requirement for
ABC's, a fifteen-day advance purchase for OTC's, a seven-day
minimum stay period for both, and considerably more limited sub-
stitution rights than are provided for in the CAB's Public Charter
rules. Moreover, after expiration of the two-year period, negotia-
tions are required before any country-of-origin rules can apply. In
short, the British did not go nearly as far as the Dutch in agreeing
to United States country-of-origin rules. One might attribute the
difference to the fact that only one year before, in Bermuda II,
Great Britain had satisfied most of its route objectives in the United
States. But it is also probably true that the Netherlands--at both
airline and governmental levels-is much more disposed to en-
courage free competition than is Great Britain.
If Britain failed to accept American ideas on charters, it more
than met United States demands on fare reductions-which for
the supplemental carriers immediately turned out to be not a prize
but a problem. During the weeks prior to the March, 1978, nego-
tiations and agreement between Great Britain and the United
States, the British government had effectively prevented Pan Amer-
ican, TWA, and Braniff from offering budget and standby fares to
London from any United States city other than New York. This
meant that from all interior United States cities, the American
supplemental carriers would be shielded from the low-fare com-
petition of the majors' budget and standby fares. But even as Bri-
tain accepted portions of the liberalized United States charter rules,
it proposed budget/standby fares from each of the other United
States cities (Philadelphia, Washington, Detroit, Chicago, Miami,
Los Angeles, and San Francisco) to which British Airways op-
erates." This action immediately entitled all the United States
31 United States-United Kingdom Air Service Agreement, Amendment Con-
cerning Charter Services of April 25, 1978, - U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. 8965.
2 Bermuda II Agreement, July 23, 1977, United States-United Kingdom, -
U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. 8641.
33See TRAVEL WEEKLY, Mar. 2, 1978, at 2; N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1978, at 1;
id., Mar. 18, 1978, at 29.
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scheduled carriers operating to London to implement their own
standby and budget fares, all told making such fares (which were
often as much as sixty percent less than basic economy fares)
available from some fourteen U.S.-gateway cities. This news was
hardly a welcome development for the U.S. supplementals-a fact
which the British must have viewed with some glee. But to the
American traveller and the CAB, the news was hailed as a major
success in providing the travelling public, as President Carter put
it, "with a wide choice of low fares in scheduled service."3
IV. THE ECONOMICS OF SUPPLEMENTAL CARRIERS
The American supplemental air transportation industry has al-
ways claimed that there must be at least a fifty dollar differential
in price between the charter fare and scheduled carriers' individu-
ally ticketed fare in the New York-London market (more: for more
distant markets) in order for charter carriers to be able to compete
for the passenger.' Assuming this is true, then the following chart,
prepared by the U.S. supplemental carriers, suggests that even as
to Super-Apex fares (i.e., $290 New York-London round trip with
at least a twenty-one day advance purchase and a stay of seven to
sixty days), competition on international routes by supplemental
carriers seemed possible only during the summer of 1978, and not
in the off-seasons.' When the Super-Apex fare is compared to the
3 See N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1978, at 29. There is a report, since confirmed,
that the British government was even prepared, as part of its agreement with the
United States, to allow "part charters," which would permit scheduled carriers
to devote up to 15% of the space on any flight to charter-type passengers. But
the United States supplemental industry, evidently feeling that this would give the
scheduled carriers too great an edge, insisted that this portion of the agreement
be put aside, and the United States delegation acceded to the supplementals' de-
mand. When this occurred, the chief British delegate, Sir Patrick Shovelton, com-
mented that "when it doesn't suit this great country of free enterprise and com-
petition to be competitive, down come the shutters of protection." See Remarks
of Alfred E. Kahn before a Symposium on the Changing Environment of Inter-
national Air Commerce, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. (May 4,
1978); 3 AIR LAw 163, 166-67 (1978). Not to be outdone, Kahn, then Chairman
of the CAB, replied that while he got "cold feet" about allowing part charters
this time, he was not going to protect the supplementals if it turned out they
could not compete. Id.
I See, e.g., Overview Presentation before the U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board and
U.S. Department of Transportation and U.S. Congress on the Supplemental In-
dustry, by Edward J. Driscoll, President and Chief Executive, National Air Car-
riers Association (Jan. 25, 1978), at 20.
1 APEX stands for "advance purchase excursion," an individually ticketed
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round-trip fare of approximately $235 offered by the Laker Sky-
train or the round-trip budget/standby fare of $256 (or $299
peak) offered by the scheduled carriers, one could understand the
serious concern of the supplementals.
CHART II
RELATIONSHIP OF SUPER-APEX FARES
TO RETAIL CHARTER PRICES
(New York to London Round Trip Prices)
Winter Summer Winter Winter
1977/78 1978 1978/79 77/78
(At Cost Ops.)*
Super Apex Fare $290 $429 $349 $269
Average Retail Charter $285 $347 $299 $247
Differential $ 5 $ 82 $ 50 $ 43
Ratio 1.02 1.24 1.17 1.17
* Only possible with DC-10.
Source: Overview Presentation before the U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board and U.S.
Department of Transportation and U.S. Congress on the Supplemental
Industry by Edward J. Driscoll, President and Chief Executive Officer,
National Air Carriers Association, Jan. 25, 1978, at 25.
It is too early to judge how serious the impact of the new sched-
uled fares will be on the supplemental carriers. An aviation indus-
try in the United States without at least some of the carriers that
grew prominent as supplemental carriers-Capitol, World, TIA,
and ONA-is hard to imagine. But in April, 1978, ONA an-
nounced the suspension of its operations in the face of massive
operating losses;-, and, as previously mentioned, all the other major
supplemental carriers were actively seeking throughout 1978 to
lay the foundations for various types of scheduled services.
In viewing the role of the supplementals, the 1977 year-end sta-
tistics on aircraft ownership are helpful. Compared to Pan Amer-
ican, which owned ninety-eight aircraft (including forty B-747's),
and TWA with 203 aircraft (including nine B-747's, thirteen
DC- 10's and twenty-four L- 1011 's), or even National with fifty-
fare available between the United States and some countries in Europe. Super-
Apex was a lower priced version of APEX with some variation in the require-
ments for advance payment and permissible duration of stay.
3 See 236 Av. DAiLY 289, 318, 339 (1978); TRAVEL WEEKLY, Apr. 27, 1978,
at 95.
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three aircraft (including fifteen DC-10's), 8 the four major U.S.-
flag supplemental carriers are quite small and operate fairly old
fleets (see Chart III). On the other hand, in terms of passenger sta-
tistics the supplemental carriers have been meaningful competitors
for tourist traffic (see Chart IV).
CHART I
U.S. SUPPLEMENTAL AIR CARRIERS
(Certificated by Civil Aeronautics Board)
Fleet Reported to FAA as of Dec. 31, 1977
AIR CARRIERS
Aircraft Models (Number) December, 1977
CAPITOL INTERNATIONAL Dc-8 (13) 13
EVERGREEN INTERNATIONAL
DC-8 (4); DC-9 (3); cv-580 (5);




DC-10 (2);Dc-8 (6) 8
RICH INTERNATIONAL
c-46 (3);DC-6 (2) 5
TRANS INTERNATIONAL
DC-10 (3); DC-8 (7);
L-188 (7); L-382 (12) 29
WORLD AIRWAYS
B-747 (1); DC-8 (5) 6
ZANTOP INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES
DC-8 (2); cv-640 (14);
L-188 (8); DC-6 (12) 36
TOTAL 114
Source: 236 AVIATION DAILY 151 (1978).
Im236 Av. DAILY 151 (1978) (figures reported by airlines to FAA as of
December 30, 1977).




Rev. Passenger Miles Passengers
1977 (000) 1976 1977 (000) 1976
Domestic
Capitol 333,873 222,844 181,233 124,586
Evergreen 88,151 26,046 117,678 30,286
McCulloch 17,114 80,006 15,107 34,870
Overseas 261,786 402,510 96,364 152,090
Rich - - - -
Trans. Intl. 120,901 106,955 67,954 51,044
World 185,004 74,100 77,112 31,187
Zantop - - -
Total 1,006,829 912,461 555,448 424,063
International
Capitol 1,762,388 1,085,915 518,981 324,625
Evergreen 60,766 - 32,048 -
McCulloch 2,699 21,879 403 7,138
Overseas 1,603,435 1,218,085 445,579 340,169
Rich - - -
Trans Intl. 2,173,344 2,492,034 511,705 552,096
World 1,758,652 917,326 398,165 219,560
Zantop - - -
Total 7,361,284 5,735,239 1,906,881 1,443,588
Civilian Total 8,368,113 6,647,700 2,462,329 1,867,651
Source: 236 AVIATION DAILY 168 (1978).
Scheduled airlines have themselves become large and successful
charter carriers. For the twelve-month period ending September 30,
1977, CAB figures show that scheduled airlines carried two-thirds
of all charter passengers." When one adds the charters performed
by foreign-flag carriers, it turns out, that the share of charter traffic
carried by U.S.-supplemental carriers amounts to something be-
tween twenty and twenty-five percent of the international charter
market. Of course, this is still a substantial number of passengers.
Moreover, one may expect that the flexible and innovative charac-
ter of the U.S. supplemental carriers will permit at least some of
31 CAB Docket No. 32242, supra note 8, at 9.
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them to survive in one form or another. But it seems reasonable to
suggest that the golden age of charters may be over in the current
age of price competition for all categories of air transport service.
V. THE CHANGING PHILOSOPHY OF THE CAB APPROACH
TO CHARTERS
It is difficult to see a consistent approach to charters in the eco-
nomic regulatory climate of the United States over the past ten
years. Initially, the CAB seems to have welcomed the idea of hav-
ing a few relatively small airlines which could provide lower cost
service by operating with full plane-loads and which would be free
from the strictures of IATA rate-making machinery. So long as affi-
nity charters were limited in their ability to attract passengers, there
was a pleasing balance from the point of view of the United States
government-just enough competition to be able to say that free
enterprise was still around (and to put some pressures on the IATA
rate-makers), but not so much competition as would threaten either
the scheduled carrier establishment or the conference system of
rate-making under IATA. This balance continued throughout the
.1960's but began to come apart as the affinity concept was stretched
and finally submerged in a sea of legally questionable activity on
the part of both the supplemental and the scheduled carrier indus-
tries. Everyone was selling affinity charters, no matter the affinity,
and the only question was how best to hide all the arrangements
from the CAB and from IATA.
In retrospect, one may say that the vast but illegal sale of affinity
charter transportation in the late 1960's and early 1970's was the
first real example of price competition in the transatlantic market.
But it was a form of competition which the CAB could not quite
tolerate. In small stages, the CAB began to introduce charter lib-
eralization (ITC's, TGC's, etc.), as much to provide a response
to the rampant gray and black markets accompanying the sale of
affinity charters as to serve the purpose of increasing competition.
There is no reason to believe, however, that this liberalization was
part of a master plan, for until recently, no one could really tell
whether the Board's principal object in liberalizing charters was
.to promote competition or to bring some kind of a halt to the illegal
activities that were prospering around the affinity charter market.
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In the middle of 1977, however, the CAB's approach seems to
have changed. With the arrival on the scene of its Democratic
Chairman, Alfred Kahn, and its Republican Member, Elizabeth
Bailey, the Board seems to have adopted a philosophy and direction
favoring deregulation and competition on all fronts. The CAB no
longer thinks in terms of alternatives to affinity charters or even of
the threat of diversion from the scheduled industry. It seems rather
to think in terms of how charter transportation, whether provided
by the scheduled or supplemental industry, can work to assure that
competition and all of its advantages (as well as disadvantages)
are made available to air travellers to and from the United States.
VI. EPILOGUE
In retrospect, it may now be said that the first six months of 1978
represented a period of relatively orderly progress, by the United
States towards a more competitive domestic as well as international
aviation community. The last six months, on the other hand, was
a period of largely unexpected events, thrusting the United States
beyond anyone's predictions as to the pace and scope of competi-
tion. To review all of the relevant events of the second half of 1978
would take us beyond our present focus-the supplementals and
international aviation. A brief mention of the turbulence of autumn
1978 is necessary, however, to set the stage for this epilogue.
A. The New Environment
First, Chairman Kahn resigned from the CAB to become Presi-
dent Carter's chief inflation fighter. For better or worse, Kahn not
only had a greater impact on aviation than perhaps anyone else on
the world scene since the Second World War, but he also brought
to an end the pervasive system of regulation that had guided United
States aviation policy for thirty years.
Second, the Congress confirmed the American public's weariness
with regulation by finally passing, after years of effort, the first
basic overhaul of the economic provisions of the Federal Aviation
Act.' For domestic aviation, the new legislation mandates a policy
4
*Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705, approved October 25, 1978 (amending
various sections of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. SS 1301 et seq.
(1976)). It is indicative of the mood of the Congress that the Senate version of
the bill was entitled "Air Transportation Regulatory Reform Act of 1978" and the
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of completely open entry by 1981, and elimination of the CAB
itself by 1985. For foreign (i.e., international) air transportation,
the policy mandate of the new legislation is essentially unchanged,
but the procedures for securing certification are required to be
speeded up and the exemption authority is broadened. In the area
of charters, the new law endorses the public charter rules by pro-
hibiting the Board from adopting charter rules more restrictive than
those of the public charter type.' The new law also eliminates the
word "supplemental" from the statute, substituting "charter carri-
er" and "charter certificates." As to the sale of tours by charter car-
riers directly to the public without resort to independent tour op-
erators, the new law adopts a compromise which calls for the Board
to submit a report on the subject to Congress by May 1, 1979. '
Within days of the new law's enactment, the scheduled carriers
withdrew all the court challenges previously filed against the
Board's Public Charter rules and the Board's interim charter lib-
eralizations of late 1977 and early 1978. '
Third, Pan American World Airways, long the country's (and
the world's) leading international airline, announced that it would
suspend scheduled services to nearly all its European gateways ex-
cept London, Frankfurt, and Rome." At the same time, Pan Am
undertook a major effort to gain entry into the domestic market
House version was entitled "Air Service Improvement Act of 1978." In its final
version, the legislation was renamed the "Airline Deregulation Act of 1978."
41 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, § 20, 92 Stat. 1705
(amending 49 U.S.C. § 1371(n)(2) (1976)). See also id., Title XVI.
4 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, § 5(a), 92 Stat. 1705
(amending 49 U.S.C. § 1308 (1976)).
4' The Board finally adopted the Public Charter Rules formally on August 14,
1978. See 43 Fed. Reg. 36,604 (1978) (to be codified in 14 C.F.R. S 380). By
then, however, their adoption caused almost no stir---except for the usual court
challenge which the scheduled carriers (Americans, Eastern, Northwest, TWA and
Western) filed in September, 1978. See American Airlines v. CAB, No. 78-1873
(D.C. Cir., filed Sept., 1978). The only significant difference between the rules
as formally published and as originally proposed in March, 1978, was that (in
addition to single entity and overseas military charters) affinity charters were
retained. Otherwise the whole alphabet of earlier charters was abolished as of
December 31, 1978.
"This meant abandoning Amsterdam, Ankara, Lisbon, Paris, Vienna, Mos-
cow, and all of Eastern Europe (except Warsaw). In addition, Pan Am simultane-
ously abandoned its transtlantic service from Portland and Boston and its non-stop
service to Brussels. Pan Am had earlier dropped its services to the Scandinavian
countries. Braniff, which had earlier begun serving Europe from Dallas, moved
to take up some of the routes abandoned by Pan Am.
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through a proposed merger with National Airlines. In one swoop,
Pan Am thus was not only attempting to establish itself as a major
domestic trunk carrier but it was also bringing to a definitive close
the never-quite-ended debate over the chosen instrument theory in
United States international aviation policy.
Fourth, IATA, responding to challenges from all sides, came up
with a novel plan designed to preserve the Association and even
its rate-making Traffic Conferences, while at the same time allow-
ing the United States and those countries sharing the American
view to enjoy open rates and free competition over the North At-
lantic and possibly elsewhere as well. Further, IATA proposed a
two-tier system of membership whereby carriers could participate
in the highly useful technical and clearing house functions of the
organization without also participating in all of its rate-making
functions.' Whether any of the charter carriers would now join
IATA as they began to open their scheduled services, remained un-
clear at year-end.
Fifth, the United States Government followed up its break-
through with the Netherlands by negotiating a series of bilateral
agreements on the same pattern-a trade-off of new U.S. points
in return for liberal country-of-origin rules for both charters and
fares, unlimited airline designation rights for the United States, and
increasing flexibility for U.S. carriers to serve any points in, be-
tween, and beyond the foreign country from any points in the
United States. First came Israel in July, 1978; then came West
Germany and Belgium in the course of the fall.' Other countries,
-"As this article went to press, the CAB had pending before it an Order to
Show Cause proceeding looking to the possible disapproval of IATA's rate-making
-Traffic Conference machinery. See C.A.B. Order No. 78-6-78 (June 12, 1978).
IATA's proposed plan was filed in that proceeding on Nov. 3, 1978, and was
entitled Implementation of [IATA] Executive Committee Recommendations on
Traffic Conference Procedures and Objectives, and Proposed Provisions for the
Conduct of IATA Traffi Conferences. On January 31, 1979, Pan American
officially an-ounced that, effective March 31, 1979, it was resigning from all of
IATA's traffic conferences, but would continue to participate in IATA's clearing
house and other interline activities. See 241 Av. DAILY 177 (1979) and TRAVEL
WEEKLY, Feb. 8, 1979, at 1. Northwest and Delta Airlines had previously also
resigned.
"The agreement with Israel was the first to adopt a new type of rate article
which assured full rate competition by prohibiting rate suspensions on the part
of either party unless the other party first consents. Israel's new landing rights
in the U.S. were at Chicago, Miami, and two additional points to be selected
next year. See Protocol Amending the United States-Israel Air Transport Agree-
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too, were negotiating new air arrangements with the United States,
in the realization that the longer it took to come to terms with the
new American approach, the less the United States would be likely
to concede in regard to gateways." At the close of 1978, only
France, Italy, and Great Britain, among the major North Atlantic
aviation powers, were holding to their prior policies.
B. The Supplementals in the New Environment
If the first half of 1978 marked the period when the supplemen-
tals were giving serious thought to becoming scheduled carriers, the
last half of 1978 was the period when the thought was translated
into action. On September 5, 1978, the Board granted temporary
exemption authority for World Airways to operate scheduled serv-
ices to Amsterdam and for Capitol to operate scheduled services to
Brussels, the first time scheduled route authority had ever been
awarded to supplemental carriers. Both carriers spoke of a start-up
time in early 1979." Within days of this historic action, the CAB
ment, signed August 16, 1978 - U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. 9002. West Germany
obtained new landing rights at Miami, Atlanta, San Juan, and three other points
yet to be named. The United States let it be known, however, that it would have
been even more generous with U.S. points but for West Germany's reluctance to
accept an Israeli-type rate article. See Protocol of November 1, 1978 relating to
the U.S.-Federal Republic of Germany Air Transport Agreement of 1955, -
U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. 8918. The Agreement with Belgium was hailed as "the
most liberal" pact yet to be reached. It included all the open skies opportunities of
the Israeli and West German pacts plus virtually open skies for cargo services,
and the opportunity for U.S. airlines to operate charter services out of Belgium
for Belgian residents but under liberalized U.S. charter rules. Belgium received
three U.S. points yet to be named and Atlanta-Mexico-beyond rights. Protocol of
November 8, 1978 Relating to U.S.-Belgium Air Transport Agreement of 1946,
- U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. _ .
47 In late October, the U.S. and Peru also agreed on a new pact which, though
not as liberal as the U.S. would have wished, represented one of the first liberal-
izing breakthroughs by the U.S. in the traditionally restrictive South American
market. See Memorandum of Understanding of October 21, 1978 on Air Trans-
port Relations Between the U.S. and Peru, - U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S._ . See
also 239 Av. DAILY 284 (1978). In addition, by mid-November, the U.S. had
also reached a liberalized agreement with Poland. Agreement of November 9,
1978 to Amend and Extend the U.S.-Poland Air Transport Agreement of 1972,
- U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. __ . See The Washington Post, Nov. 13, 1978,
D, at 14, col. 1.
41239 Av. DAILY 18, 28 (1978); TRAVEL WEEKLY, Sept. 14, at 1; id., Sept. 18,
at 3. CAB Order 78-9-2, Dockets Nos. 32523 and 32673 (Sept. 1, 1978). By Sep-
tember 21, 1978, Pan Am and TWA had announced that they would be appeal-
ing this action to the U.S. Court of Appeals. 239 Av. DAILY 108 (1978). Pan
American and TWA v. CAB, No. 78-1880 and 78-1888 (D.C. Cir.). These ap-
peals have since been withdrawn, presumably because both Pan Am and TWA
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announced that it would also be granting World scheduled rights
to the Far East." By October, the Board had decided to grant Cap-
itol and World the scheduled transcontinental authority both had
previously sought."
Also in October, World announced its purchase of three addi-
tional DC-10-30CF aircraft with options for still three more. At
the same time, it announced a loss of $616,000 for the first six
months of 1978 compared to a $595,000 profit for the same period
in 1977. But World's president attributed this loss to non-operating
factors and said that the low fares of the scheduled carriers had
affected World "only to a limited extent.""1 Thereafter, with the
newly liberalized U.S.-Germany bilateral agreement in mind, World
applied for exemption and permanent authority to provide low-
fare services from six U.S. cities to Munich, Frankfurt, Hamburg
and Dusseldorf. On January 11, 1979, the CAB awarded to World
exemption authority to Munich and Frankfurt."'
TIA was equally active. In addition to its earlier requests for
Laker-type authority between Los Angeles and London, plus trans-
continental and transpacific scheduled authority, TIA also applied
have also recently received route awards under the CAB's exemption authority.
The critical issue is whether the Board can rely on its power to grant exemptions
in order to authorize temporary rights without a hearing, while withholding perm-
anent rights until the lengthy hearing process is completed. When the Board used
its exemption power to grant the temporary rights to World and TIA, it granted
similar temporary rights to two scheduled carriers, National and Northwest. The
proceeding in which a hearing will be held and a decision reached as to perma-
nent rights has been renamed from the Miami-Luxembourg Low Fare Investiga-
tion to the U.S.-Benelux Proceeding. CAB Order 78-7-30 (July 10, 1978)
consolidated the applications of 17 carriers, all seeking various types of perma-
nent U.S.-origin authority to the three Benelux countries. See 43 Fed. Reg. 30,850
(1978); CAB Docket No. 30790. See EDITOR'S NOTE at 508.
4'239 Av. DAILY 34 (1978). See CAB Order 78-9-33, Docket Nos. 32634
and 32635 (Sept. 7, 1978).
11239 Av. DAILY 293 (1978). On January 12, 1979, the Board issued its
formal order granting transcontinental authority to both Capitol and World,
but denying World its requested temporary exclusivity. In the same order, the
Board issued similar authority to American and Pan American. CAB Order
79-1-75, Docket 30356 (Jan. 12, 1979). See 241 Av. DAILY 74, 82 (1979).
"1239 Av. DAILY 244 (1978).
12 CAB Docket Nos. 33636, 33637. See 240 Av. DAILY 138, 154 (1978);
TRAVEL WEEKLY, Oct. 16, 1978, at 131. See CAB Order 79-1-73, Docket No.
33637 (Jan. 11, 1979). At the same time, the Board also granted comparable
authority to serve Frankfurt and other points in West Germany to TIA, Capitol,
Seaboard, and Braniff. See 241 Av. DAILY 98 (1979). On the question of the le-
gality of exemption authority, see note 48 supra.
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for exemption and permanent authority to serve Vienna, and on
October 27, 1978, this request was granted." TIA also applied
for and received exemption authority to provide scheduled services
to Brussels and Amsterdam, Frankfurt, and Paris-all from various
U.S. cities.' By year-end, TIA was awaiting a Board decision on
its requests to provide low fare scheduled service to Tel Aviv from
Los Angeles, Chicago, and New York via Amsterdam and Zurich."
Like World, TIA also announced new aircraft purchases, includ-
ing two B-747's, with options on an additional six.' As though
to complete its game-plan, TIA was simultaneously seeking Board
approval, on an interim-exemption basis, to create a wholly-owned
subsidiary charter tour operator. TIA argued that such vertical in-
tegration may be the wave of the future, even as several established
tour operators (e.g., Arthur's Travel, Carefree Travel, and Inter-
national Weekends) had already asked the Board for direct carrier
permits. Within days, World announced it would be supporting
TIA's request."
Meanwhile, it was reported that a Boston tour operator was seek-
ig to purchase ONA's certificates for $500,000, and the Board's
staff was advising the Board that, except for inclusive tours, the
Board ought not to prohibit the supplementals from selling tickets
for transportation-only charters directly to the public or indirectly
through wholly-owned tour operators.' If there were any doubts
about whether the supplementals were going to continue pushing
charters, TIA announced an ambitious eighteen million dollar pub-
lic charter program to Europe and Israel, while World's president
53239 Av. DAILY 324 (1978). TWA was granted the same authority simul-
taneously. CAB Order 78-10-132 (Oct. 26, 1978).
54240 Av. DAILY 154 (1978). TIA formally received its authority on January
11, 1979. See note 52 supra.
55 See CAB Order 78-12-174, Docket Nos. 33209, 31217, and 33838 (Dec. 26,
1978).
"239 Av. DAILY 307 (1978).
57TRAVEL WEEKLY, Nov. 20, 1978, at 51; 240 Av. DAILY 116 (1978).
"1239 Av. DAILY 108 (1978), 240 Av. DAILY 150 (1978). By early February,
1979, it was reported that the $500,000 sale of ONA's certificate had collapsed,
and ONA was searching out new prospective buyers. 241 Av. DAILY 206 (1979).
Given the relative ease with which new authority can now be obtained from the
Board, it will be interesting to see what continuing market value ONA's certificate
will have. Chairman Kahn once said that one of his goals at the Board "was to
reduce the value of these monopoly franchises (route certificates) to zero". The
Washington Star, March 29, 1978, A-3, col. 5.
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was making public assurances that, despite its newly obtained
scheduled authority, World still intended to be the largest supple-
mental carrier and was planning on "an increase of twenty percent
in charter sales next year.""9
Capitol was initially somewhat less ambitious in its expansion
plans, apparently preferring to implement its transcontinental and
Benelux exemption authority before biting off anything more. In
mid-year, 1978, Capitol had announced a loss of about two million
dollars but expectations of a "little profit and perhaps a break-even"
at year-end."0 By late November, however, its appetite increased,
and it filed for exemption authority for scheduled services to
Frankfurt via Brussels." Meanwhile, Seaboard, which had earlier
applied for Benelux scheduled-passenger authority from some fif-
teen cities in the United States, decided in August to apply for
scheduled rights between the United States and nine points in the
Far East and India; by November, Seaboard had also applied for
exemption authority to serve New York-Frankfurt, Cologne, and
Munich." Another of the supplementals, Evergreen, was seeking
scheduled Benelux and transpacific rights, even as the Board was
using expedited show-cause procedures to award Evergreen what
would amount to virtually world-wide charter rights.'
As though even this amount of activity were not enough, the
Board instituted a mammoth proceeding, the "Former Large Ir-
regular Air Service Investigation," in which more than sixty com-
panies filed applications to become supplemental carriers." In an-
ticipation of this proceeding, the Board on January 11, 1979 grant-
ed substantially all the transatlantic exemption authority requested
59239 Av. DAILY 244 (1978); 240 Av. DAILY 116 (1978).
00238 Av. DAILY 217 (1978).
"1 240 Av. DAILY 90 (1978). Capitol received its authority on January 11,
1979. See note 52 supra.
02240 Av. DAILY 90 (1978). Seaboard received its New York-Frankfurt/
Cologne/Munich authority on January 11, 1979. See note 52 supra. Seaboard's
application for the Far East is pending in CAB Dockets 33264 and 33068.
''See CAB Docket Nos. 30790 and 33068. On February 1, 1979, the Board
formally granted the requested charter authority to Evergreen. CAB Order 79-2-3,
Dockets 31147 and 31837.
" TRAVEL WEEKLY, July 31, 1978, at 43. The case has since been divided into
three separate proceedings--one involving applicants who once operated air
services but no longer do so (Docket No. 33361), a second involving applicants
who now operate air services (Docket No. 33362), and the third involving all
other applicants (Docket No. 33363).
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by the supplemental carriers." And though not quite lost in the
shuffle of all these developments, Freddie Laker-one year to the
day after Skytrain I began its London-New York service-inaugu-
rated his Skytrain II between London and Los Angeles. To under-
score his confidence, Laker spoke of the 265,000 passengers car-
fled, and the five million dollar profit earned, by Skytrain I in its
first full year of service.6
While the scheduled United States carriers virtually all enjoyed
a banner year, the profit picture for the large supplementals seemed
mixed. According to figures released by the Board in November,
1978, covering the first eight months of the year,"7 only TIA showed
an improved operating profit over the same period in 1977. World
showed a profit but reduced from 1977, while Capitol went from
a 1977 profit to a 1978 loss. At the same time, however, World
increased its U.S.-Europe passengers by over forty percent during
both June and July over the same months in 1977. TIA showed de-
creases in its European traffic of 28.8 percent and 8.5 percent dur-
ing these two months, while Capitol showed an increase of 5.7 per-
cent in June and a decrease of 1.4 percent in July. If the supple-
mentals' profit pictures had changed, therefore, it was probably im-
possible to attribute those changes to the number of passengers they
carried over the North Atlantic. Moreover, system-wide the Board's
data showed that their business "compared favorably with 1977, a
very good year, at least through the second quarter of 1978." And
for the third quarter, the Board's data showed that (excluding
ONA) Capitol, TIA, World, and Evergreen together enjoyed an
eight percent increase in their system-wide traffic over the third
quarter of 1977.
To be sure, transatlantic charter traffic fell during the third quar-
ter by some twenty-three percent for all carriers, with a thirty-seven
percent decrease in charter passengers for the scheduled carriers
"See CAB Order 79-1-73, Docket No. 33637 (Jan. 11, 1979). In early Feb-
ruary, the Board also granted new or additional authority to serve various West
German points to TWA, Delta, World, and Aeromerica. See CAB Order 79-2-60.
Standing in the wings until they could prove their fitness were two other U. S.
carriers-Lelco, Inc. d/b/a Air Berlin USA, and Davis Air Lines. 241 Av. DAILY
226, 235 (1979).
6 TRAVEL WEEKLY, Oct. 12, 1978, at 2.
"
TSee CAB, MEMORANDUM, TREND AND OUTLOOK FOR CHAPTER OPERATIONS
AND COACH AND DEEP-DISCOUNT TRANSATLANTIC TRAFFIC (Nov. 6, 1978) [here-
inafter cited as CAB MEMORANDUM]; See also 239 Av. DAILY 184 (1978).
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(compensated by an almost twenty percent increase in their sched-
uled traffic)."' The supplementals (including ONA) showed a ten
percent drop in their North Atlantic traffic during the third quarter.
Excluding ONA and Evergreen, however, the July data showed a
gain for World of forty-five percent in its U.S.-Europe charter traf-
fic, with percentage losses of only 8.5 percent for TIA and 1.4 per-
cent for Capitol. 9
While several different conclusions could be drawn from these
statistics, they make clear that contrary to the fears of the first half
of the year, the U.S.-flag supplementals were not on the brink of
extinction by the end of the third quarter of 1978. Indeed, the real
victims of the new approach may well have been the foreign sup-
plementals, whose U.S.-Europe traffic showed almost a thirty-eight
percent decline in July, 1978, from July, 1977. Moreover, by late
November, 1978, the U.S. supplementals were predicting fourth
quarter gains of fifty-nine percent system-wide and sixty-five per-
cent over the North Atlantic, attributing their change in fortunes
to "growth and aggressive sales.""0 By the time this article is pub-
lished, the picture may have changed again. But as of year-end
1978, it looked as if the supplemental carriers would be able to
"See CAB MEMORANDUM, note 67 supra, Tables 3 and 9; 239 Av. DAILY
239 (1978).9 See CAB MEMORANDUM, note 67 supra, Tables 3, 9, and 11. In a follow-up
Memorandum of January 16, 1979, the Board's staff concluded that, while deep
discount fares had cut total charter traffic from the 1977 highs "especially in the
transatlantic markets," they "have not imperiled the charter carriers generally."
The staff pointed out, however, that after a great 1977, "charter carriers' trans-
atlantic charter passengers ...have been declining deeply in recent periods and
the decline continued in the third quarter-the top of the season." Statistically,
the third quarter decline of 1978 over 1977 on U.S.-Europe charter traffic by
U. S. supplementals was 14.5%. The Board's staff added that "[t]he negative
figures are deeper in the New York-London market, where competition of standby
and deep-discount fares is sharpest." At the same time, however, the staff con-
cluded that collectively the U. S. supplementals had "maintained their total system
traffic through the charter season" and that, all things considered, it was no
longer necessary for the Board to continue the periodic reporting requirements
which had originally been promulgated in late 1977 as a means to gauge the
impact of discount fares on the U. S. supplemental carriers. See also 241 Av.
DAILY 191 (1979); TRAVEL WEEKLY, Feb. 8, 1979, at 3.
7 TRAVEL WEEKLY, Nov. 23, 1978, at I; CAB MEMORANDUM, note 67 supra,
Table 3. The Memorandum submitted to the Board by its staff on January 16,
1979, note 69 supra, contained a Table 3, showing that the U. S. supplementals
operated 52% more seats systemwide and 84% more seats on the North Atlantic
during October and November, 1978 than in the same two months of 1977.
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continue to compete with the majors, both in bulk and in individu-
ally ticketed transportation."
CONCLUSION
Some have said that in aviation as elsewhere the United States
may finally have bitten off more than it can chew. The ultimate
outcome, they predict, is that the United States will have given
away to foreign carriers too many important United States traffic
points while presiding over the demise of its own supplemental air-
line industry. Even if IATA no longer sets transatlantic fares, as
this scenario goes, the scheduled carriers of all nationalities will be
able to raise their transatlantic rates with impunity, because there
will be no supplementals to push prices down. In our judgment,
this scenario is quite unlikely.
In the first place, once IATA's transatlantic rate-making func-
tions are replaced by CAB-mandated forces of competition, there
is no likely possibility that there will be any generally agreed-upon
transatlantic rates, especially of the promotional type. Second, with
or without charters, there will be enough carriers operating across
the North Atlantic over different routes and with different classes
of service to make fixed prices unlikely. Moreover, if a pattern of
price fixing seems to be reappearing, the CAB could well certificate
a new "low-price" carrier, and so long as the prospect of new entry
is real, such a threat will itself reinforce the unlikelihood of fixed
prices. If the industry shows signs of recession, restraints are more
likely in capacity than in prices.
Over time, then, we would expect the distinctions between char-
ter and scheduled services and carriers to become ever more
n Perhaps more important than any of the charter statistics were the data re-
ported by the INS for the second quarter of 1978, showing a 5.6% increase in
U.S. citizen departures to Europe over the same period in 1977 (from 1,176,196
to 1,242,313) but a 26.8% increase in foreigners arriving in the United States
from Europe (from 613,315 to 777,863). See TRAVEL WEEKLY, Oct. 23, 1978,
at 88. For the first five months of the year, the U.K. and Italy showed increases
,of 37.6% and 31.4% (respectively) in their tourist departures for the United
States. See 239 Av. DAILY 199 (1978). These increases seem to be attributable
both to the low air fares and to the declining value of the U.S. dollar. Statistics
for the latter half of 1978 showed continuing sharp increases. TRAVEL WEEKLY,
Jan. 15, 1979, at 1. By mid-January, 1979, it was learned that Pan American was
obtaining more than 50% of its passenger revenues from overseas sales. 241
Av. DAILY 113 (1979). If this trend continues, the day will come soon when
-the historic U. S. tourist imbalance approaches equilibrium.
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blurred. Quite likely, some system in the nature of the "open skies"
that the United States proposed at the Chicago Conference almost
thirty-five years ago will emerge."' No one would have dreamed five
years ago, let alone thirty-five years ago, that by the spring of 1978
some twenty-five cities in the United States would be available to
serve as gateways across the North Atlantic. Nor, we think, would
anyone have predicted the pace of developments sketched in this
Epilogue, all of which occurred after the bulk of this article had
been written. It turns out, after all, that competition is possible in
international air transport-not only as to sandwiches and steward-
esses' smiles, but as to flexibility of service, conditions of booking,
and above all as to price. What the charter carriers' final role will
be, we do not know. As the agent of change, the charter carriers'
place in history is secure.
EDITOR'S NOTE: On February 23, 1979, as this article went to
press, Administrative Law Judge Burton S. Kolko issued a decision
in the U.S.-Benelux Proceeding, recommending that all the appli-
cants be given permanent authority to serve all Benelux countries
from any U.S. point. This decision will now be reviewed by the
C.A.B.
1 In January, 1979, the U.S. State Department announced that, while it would
be offering open skies bilateral agreements to all takers, the long range goal was
a liberal multilateral pact with "Europe as an entity rather than pecking away
on the bilateral approach." 241 Av. DAILY 9 (1979). The same goal was later
voiced also by the CAB. 241 Av. DAILY 51 (1979).
